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From Mythology to Logic
Dewey’s View of Modernity and the Linguistic Nature of Experience
Roberto Gronda
1 When Dewey started working on Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy (UPMP), he
was well aware that the main aim of his new book should have been that of providing a
clear and comprehensive exposition of the philosophical views that he had formulated in
his previous works. At that time – around 1939 – Dewey was in his eighties and he had
already published almost all the great books that contributed to establish his reputation
as the most distinguished American philosopher. However, his thought was still difficult
to  understand,  partly  because of  the terminology adopted and partly  because of  the
seemingly counter-intuitiveness of many of his theses. This is the reason why some of his
students asked him to attempt to better clarify the way in which the different aspects of
his thought hold together in a consistent whole. UPMP is Dewey’s answer to that felt
need.
2 It is far from strange therefore that to a reader well acquainted with Dewey’s thought the
book may appear as a kind of recapitulation of the theoretical results obtained in his later
works – say, from Experience and Nature to Logic: Theory of Inquiry. Consequently, one may
be led to conclude that nothing really new can be found in UPMP apart from a different –
and quite likely, a better – exposition of what Dewey has already said in other places.
Such a conclusion is correct – at least in a certain sense. After all, it would be very strange
if Dewey had decided to dramatically change his philosophical orientation after more
than fifty years of philosophical investigations. Nonetheless, there is something deeply
unsatisfactory in that remark. Indeed, it seems as if something very important passes
unnoticed when the issue of the originality of UPMP is dealt with from that perspective.
The point is that the criterion is too restrictive: if one believes that the originality of
UPMP should be evaluated in terms of the number of assumptions and theses that cannot
be found in Dewey’s previous texts, he would fail to appreciate what its trait of distinctive
novelty is. What Dewey tries to articulate here is something more important than a new
set  of  theoretical  concepts.  His  aim is  rather  to  define  a  standpoint  from which  to
describe both the spirit and the direction of the process of emancipation from beliefs that
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is usually referred to as “modernity” (170). As will be shown in the following pages, the
definition of such a standpoint represents one of Dewey’s most remarkable theoretical
achievements since it enables him to ground his post-Kantian account of meaning in a
consistent philosophy of history.
3 Dewey’s entire theoretical work revolves around the search for a reliable standpoint for
philosophical  reflection.  Already  in  his  early  articles  published  on  Mind  in  1886  the
adoption of the idealistic notion of experience was functional to the development of a
general theory of meaning according to which what is real is properly defined as what can
reveal itself in human experience. To be (semantically) real is to have a meaning, to be
significant  for  human behavior.  This  is  how Dewey understands –  and accepts  –  the
fundamental idealistic insight that objectivity and subjectivity are essentially interwoven.
However, the naturalistic character of Dewey’s thought prevents him from relapsing into
those  unfortunate  habits  of  speech that  caused much of  the  confusions  traditionally
associated with German idealism. This because Dewey’s naturalistic version of idealism
does  not  aim  at  questioning  the  independence  of  reality  as  far  as  its  existence  is
concerned. It is an idealism of meaning and not an idealism of existence that Dewey tries
to work out, since what the activity of thinking is able to affect is the value that a thing
has for us, not the brute fact of its facticity.1 The existence of the world is a mystery,
Dewey states in an important passage of UPMP, because it is impossible to explain why an
event has a certain feature rather than another. What science aims to explain is not the
particular  quality  that  a  thing  presents,  but  the  correlations  holding  between  two
different  classes  of  events.  Such  regular correlation  –  where  “regular”  refers  to  a
normative content that can take the form of concept or habit, depending on whether the
norm is  apprehended reflectively  or  unreflectively  –  is  the  very  nature  of  meaning:
meaning is a form, a universal; being a universal, it is a relation which “supervenes” on
the particular things in which it is somehow “embodied”.
4 The notion of  mystery is  particularly  important  in the economy of  Dewey’s  thought
because it provides the ground for the concept of humility. Humility means that thought
is not constitutive but reconstructive, that human beings live in a world that they can
modify according to their needs only through practical work, not through manipulation
of words. Dewey is very clear on this point: reason does not supply us with a privileged
access to t he essence of reality; all the knowledge that can be acquired about the world
(both internal and external) is the outcome of a process of inquiry. But humility also
means that the world can be understood if we do not pretend to project our categories on
it. The concept of experience as formulated in the first chapter of Experience and Nature is
a powerful statement of the possibility of knowing things as they actually are.
5 The core of  Dewey’s  naturalistic  version of  idealism is  therefore the rejection of  the
metaphysical assumption that experience is essentially severed from reality. It is in the
light  of  this  fundamental  thesis  that  the  conceptual  clarification  of  the  nature  of
modernity  –  modernity  being  for  Dewey  that  tendency  of  human  reason  to  “get
everything out into the open where it can be seen and examined” (169) – acquires its
distinctive philosophical import. The search for autonomy – which is at the very same
time a search for freedom at a moral and political level – makes it possible to give a
satisfactory account of the struggles that have been scanning the rhythm of the life of
reason, as well as of the role that Dewey believes contemporary philosophy should play in
that  process.  The history of  Western philosophy is  the  history  of  a  movement  from
mythology to logic, where logic means here the genealogical inquiry into the roots of
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meaning.2 The  human world  –  the  world  that  human beings  have  been building  up
throughout their history – is grounded on some fundamental categories that are, in turn,
the product of human semantic creativity. There is no myth of the given in the space of
reason since there is not a single moment in which the organism is purely receptive of
events  happening  in  the  external  world.  Dewey’s  exposure  to  the  discoveries  of
contemporary biology – which was, and this point is worthy of notice, extremely indebted
to the theoretical achievements of German speculative philosophy – prevents him from
admitting anything essentially meaningful outside the scope of human activity. In more
technical terms, since meaning is a relation, there is nothing simpler than a relation to
which the latter can be reduced. Now, according to Dewey, modernity is precisely that
standpoint  from  which  it  is  possible  to  recognize  the  semantic  primacy  of  human
creativity.
6 ewey’s aim in UPMP is to subject the vocabulary of philosophy to rigorous criticism in
order to throw out from it everything occult, everything that does not have the necessary
credentials to be authoritative for itself. The most interesting application of this principle
is the semantic analysis of the notions of object and objectivity. Its theoretical relevance
is due to the fact that Dewey’s semantic conception of object represents the point of
coalescence of three important lines of reflection: the pragmatist emphasis on practical 
activity as the backbone of meaning, the idea of the neutrality of experience, and the
thesis of the linguistic nature of experience. According to Dewey, objects are linguistic
patterns of action, or, as he openly states in Human Nature and Conduct, are “habits turned
inside out” (MW 14: 127). Consequently, in the remaining part of the present paper those
three issues will be addressed with the aim of understanding how the – and the semantic
conception  of  objectivity  that  stems  from  them  –  contribute  to  the  process  of
development  of  the  modernity.  In  particular,  the  next  section  will  be  devoted  to
discussing the relation existing between activity and neutrality. Its goal is to answer the
following question: why is the controversial assumption of the neutrality of experience
necessary to formulate a sound pragmatist conception of meaning? The final section will
tackle the thorny problem of how Dewey conceives the relation between language and
experience. After Rorty’s plea for a linguistification of pragmatism, many interpreters
have argued for the importance of the notion of experience in the economy of Dewey’s
thought. It is a fact, Rorty has correctly observed, that in the last years of his life Dewey
decided to drop the concept of experience in favor of that of culture (LW1: 371). But
Dewey’s decision of replacing the former with the latter should not be read (as Rorty
suggests)  as  a  confession of  error and as  an implicit  acknowledgment of  the lack of
viability of a philosophy of experience. Dewey never changed his mind on that point, but
simply realized that his vocabulary centered around the notion of experience was too
idiosyncratic to convey the ideas he wanted to express. Interpreters as Koopman and
Hildebrand are therefore right in criticizing Rorty’s too easy dismissal of a concept that
runs throughout Dewey’s entire work (Koopman 2007; Hildebrand 2003). Nonetheless, the
reinstatement of experience as the fundamental category of Dewey’s naturalism cannot
be the last word on this issue because there is a strong sense in which one is entitled to
say  that,  in  Dewey’s  eyes,  experience  is  language.  Dewey’s  long  quotation  from
Malinowski’s article on Culture published on the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences stresses the
interrelatedness of  custom and artifact,  ideal  and material,  experience and language.
“[T]hat which is called material and that which is called non-material,” Dewey argues,
“cannot  and  do  not  exist  apart  from  each  other”  (291).  The  point  is  then  that  of
understanding  how these  two  seemingly  contradictory  theses  hold  together:  a)  that
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language is the source of the meaningfulness of human experience, and b) that the scope
of experience is  broader than that of  language since the latter is  a particular  way of
creating and transforming meanings which de- pends – as its condition – on the existence
of a larger context in which only words become significant. As will be pointed out, the
possibility of combining them in a consistent ac- count of meaning and objectivity relies
on  the  exploitation  of  the  metaphysical  (in  Dewey’s  technical  sense)  category  of
potentiality – along with the correlate notion of effectiveness – which constitutes one of
the ways in which the general principle of continuity is articulated.
⁂
7 The second, more theoretically oriented part of Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy
opens  with a  long discussion of  the  philosophical  meaning of  the  English empiricist
tradition from Locke to Hume. According to Dewey, classical empiricism failed because of
its incapacity to get rid of the epistemological and metaphysical biases that have plagued
Western philosophy. Locke and Berkeley were still committed to the idea of substance as
something lying behind phenomena, whereas Hume did not manage to free himself from
the belief in the “inherently mental character of the immediate data of knowledge” (175).
However, if they had been able to consistently develop their argument as required by the
logic of the discourse, they would have been led to conclude that “observed events and
their connections are entirely neutral with respect to any distinction that can be drawn
between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ and that if such a distinction is to be drawn, it must be
drawn upon grounds that are extrinsic to the observed data” (175). In doing so, they
would have been led to endorse that particular version of empiricism formulated for the
first time by William James in his Essays on Radical Empiricism. In particular, they would
have recognized the fact that experience is neutral in respect to the distinction between
subjectivity and objectivity.
8 As is well known, this is a point which Dewey has already drawn his attention to in the
first revised chapter of Experience and Nature. In the context of this text, as well as in the
general economy of Dewey’s thought, the reference to James’ conception of experience is
preliminary to the definition of a new philosophical vocabulary in which it is impossible
to assume the separation of thought and reality, subject and object as an original and
irreducible fact. On the one hand, the realization of the identity – on a semantic level –
between things and thoughts entails the logical inconsistency of skepticism and, on a
broader scale, of the whole epistemological factory. The content of the ideas that we have
in mind is the same content that we find in the objects that make up the world which we
live in, and it is only because the semantic identity of things and thoughts is there from
the very beginning – and it is not a goal that we have to create ex nihilo by bringing
together two independent realities – that it is possible for our acts of reflection to be
effective in reconstructing our transactions with the environment. On the other hand, the
idea of the primacy of experience compels us to reject any dogmatic approach to the
question of the validity of the concepts (and habits) that make the worlds of common-
sense  and  science  possible.  Thus,  the  fact  that  the  most  fundamental  element  that
structures human experience –the distinction between subject and object, thoughts and
things– can be accounted for in functional terms indirectly confirms Dewey’s thesis of the
dependence of meaning on human activity.
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9 Such issue has already been discussed at some length above in connection with Dewey’s
conception  of  modernity,  so  it  is  not  necessary  to  dwell  further  upon  it.  What  is
important to note here is rather the sense in which experience can be said to be neutral.
Indeed, it is important to remind that the kind of neutrality that Dewey advocates is not
metaphysical,  but  epistemological.  Dewey  is  not  interested  in  arguing  for  the
metaphysical thesis that the ultimate elements of reality are bits of pure experience. As
Dewey says in Experience and Nature, the goal of metaphysics is not that of discovering the
hidden nature of phenomena, but that of describing the generic traits of existence (LW1:
50). Consequently, the neutrality that Dewey takes from James has nothing to do with the
attempt  to  establish how things  really  are.  To say that  experience is  epistemologically 
neutral means only that subject and object are logical distinctions created within the
broader sphere of experience, so that there is nothing – no meaning, no concept,  no
relation – that can be said to precede experience.
10 When seen from this  perspective,  however,  the concept of  epistemological  neutrality
starts showing its revolutionary force. In the ninth chapter of Unmodern Philosophy and
Modern Philosophy Dewey addresses the much-discussed issue of the subject of experience.
Echoing a well-known passage of Experience and Nature, Dewey criticizes again those who
ask “Whose experience?” whenever experience is mentioned (191; see also LW1: 178). But
the argument that Dewey offers in support of the belief that that criticism is unwarranted
is new and more theoretically powerful than the one formulated in Experience and Nature.
Surely, Dewey still accepts the explanation of subjectivity in terms of responsibility. But
he adds an important epistemological consideration in favor of his view. He notices that it
would be meaningless to appeal to experience for verification if experience were a purely
subjective event. The reason why we look to experience as a means to settle a disputed
matter is because we are persuaded that experience is the place in which things reveal
themselves to us for what they are. “An experience that was only mine,” Dewey correctly
states, “could yield only opinions that are private to me”. Consequently, “it would follow
that experience would be incapable of furnishing the ground for any belief deserving the
name knowledge (191).
11 The  thesis  of  the  epistemological  neutrality  of  experience  implies  therefore  the
recognition of the fact that the latter is not of the nature of the objects of which we have
experience. Using a terminology that is not Dewey’s own, it can be said that experience is
the possibility that nature has to bring about meanings,  thus constituting a realm of
being which is semantically different from that of causal explanations of physical events.
So, to treat experience as if it were an object would mean to lose sight of its constitutive
role, which is that of making meanings available. Dewey had already drawn the attention
on that particular feature of experience in the Introduction to the Essays in Experimental
Logic where he distinguished – following Scudder Klyce – between terms, on the one hand,
and “infinity and zero” words,  on the other hand. While the former refer to what is
usually called an object – that is, a section of the continuum of experience –, the latter is a
sort of reminder of the “taken-for-granted whole” on the basis of which only objects are
possible3 (MW 10: 324). Experience, situation and context are instances of “infinity and
zero” words.
12 What is new and particularly remarkable in UPMP is the insistence on the naturalistic
and  biological  character  of  experience  –an  insistence  that  enables  Dewey  to  better
explain the “mereological” relation between experience and object. In the last chapter of
the book, significantly entitled Experience as Life-function, Dewey postulates a definition of
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experience as a particular kind of life-functions “whose nature is most clearly and fully
presented  in  human living,”  that  is,  a  group of  life-functions  happening  in  a  socio-
cultural environment. In other words, experience can be defined as a linguistic activity –
this is the sense of the reference in the very definition to the socio-cultural environment
–, the language being the medium which opens up the access to the realm of meaning.
Such an essential intertwining of biological and cultural aspects is adumbrated in the first
part of Logic:  Theory of  Inquiry,  but here it is the physiological ground of the unity of
culture and nature that is brought to the fore and strongly emphasized. The linguistic
activity to which we give the name of  experience is  the totality of  the physiological
activities that take place in the organism at a given time, the linguistic activity to which
we give the name of object is a particular line of action which, being identified by a
specific name or description, is repeatable and, consequently, of the nature of universal.
The  structural  similarity  between  habits  and  concepts  –  their  difference  being  a
difference of  function –  that  lies  at  the  basis  of  what  has  been called here  Dewey’s
idealistic naturalism is a direct consequence of this fact.
13 As is evident, the insistence on the centrality of body is an echo of the Jamesian idea of
the organism as a sounding-board. That revolutionary idea is developed in the light of a
general philosophy of meaning, thus acquiring a new heuristic function and a broader
application. Dewey says that “the common material out of which both of these objects
[persons and things] develop” is both affective and intellectual, the distinction between
these  two  moments  of  experience  being  a  matter  of  “progressive  physiological  and
functional differentiation and specialization within the background of body-sense as a
relatively  undifferentiated  whole”  (193).  Here  the  two  perspectives,  functional  and
genetic, are significantly fused together: the difference of function – which concerns the
dimension of validity – is structurally identical to the process of differentiation – which
obviously concerns the dimension of genesis. But what is important to note is that the
functional  and  genetic  distinctions  necessarily  relies  on  the  unity  within  which
differentiation occurs. “Any form of an organic structure which develops and operates
without the control of the processes and requirements of the whole organism,” Dewey
argues, “is an injurious abnormality” (193).
14 The dialectical unity between experience and things should now be more clear. Their unity
is provided by the notion of activity; the tension that makes their relation dynamic is the
tension existing between background and focus, singular and universal, undetermined
and  determined.  In  every  possible  course  of  action  there  is  something  which  is
unexpected, irreducible to everything that has happened before. The particular qualities
of  a  thing –  say,  its  color,  or  its  shape –,  the  spatial  and temporal  positions  of  the
organism doing  experience;  all  these  aspects  vary  from time  to  time  and  make  the
singular situation just what it is. On the contrary, the meaningfulness of the situation is
due to the persistence of habits of perception and action – and, consequently, of concepts
of reflection – that supply the agent with the means necessary to anticipate the expected
consequences of his acts,  thus making it  possible to perform an intelligent course of
behavior. Habits work by picking out some elements of a situation and treating them as
determined  potentialities.  “The  qualities  of  a  spade  as  perceived  and  named,”  Dewey
states, “are the consequences that would result if it were used (or will result when it is
used)—they  are  anticipations  of  what  is  future  at  the  limited  and  limiting  date  of
perception;  and those of  a  shovel  express  the somewhat different  consequences that
result  from  use  of  a  similar  device  that  effects  somewhat  different  ends”  (239).
From Mythology to Logic
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, V-1 | 2013
6
Accordingly, objects are means, instrumentalities, general pattern of behavior that are
“distinguished and identified on the ground of what, in a given interaction, they do to us
and we do to them”4 (239).
⁂
15 When it is made clear that an object is not a Gegenstand, something essentially opposed to
a subject, but is an entity whose content is entirely determined by the rule that specifies
the relation between an action and its consequences, a great step has been made towards
a  more  modern  conception  of  object  and  objectivity.  Indeed,  it  follows  from  this
constructivist  insight  that  there is  no real  cleft  between subject  and object,  self  and
world, since the world is semantically homogeneous to thought. What makes the passage
from one to the other possible is, evidently, the notion of meaning. Constructivism of
meaning is therefore one of the privileged ways of access to modernity because it shows
how to get rid of all the principles of authority whose validity cannot be traced back to
the activity of human beings living in a society. We should not accept anything which is
not recognized as created by us to solve a problem and, more importantly, which does not
prove itself now to be effective in directing our life.
16 It  is  difficult  to  deny  –  even  from  a  historical  point  of  view  –  that  constructivism
represents  the  element  of  greatest  affinity  between  Dewey  and  German  and  British
idealists. However, Dewey was well aware that idealism does not provide an adequate
explanation of the origin of meaning. To be a consistent philosophical position, a revised
idealism – that is, an idealism that has made the framework of contemporary biology its
own, and has been able to incorporate its fundamental principles – has to account for the
genesis of meaning in a clear and understandable way. As is well known, according to
Dewey language is the origin of meaning. In Experience and Nature Dewey openly states
that  “[w]ithout  language,  the  qualities  of  organic  action that  are  feelings  are  pains,
pleasures, odors, colors, noises, tones, only potentially and proleptically” (LW1: 198). The
function of language is that of making the “objectification” of feeling and the constitution
of  object  and objectivity possible:  by being objectified,  “they are immediate traits  of
things” (LW1: 198). This issue is taken up again and further articulated in UPMP, where it
is said that “ordered discourse does more than preserve and transmit the funded wisdom
(and foolishness) of the past” because it “is the only agency by which reflection, inquiry,
is liberated” (274). As usual in Dewey, there is a significant shift from unreflective to
reflective apprehension of meaning – a shift which amounts, in the last analysis, to a
collapse of that very distinction. Such a collapse is very problematic, but it testifies a
genuine tension in Dewey’s thought between the emphasis on the unity of experience in
all  his  possible forms – primary and secondary experience are just  different ways of
experiencing meaning – and the attention for the reconstructive role of reasoning, since
the latter presupposes something that has to be reconstructed. But what Dewey has in
mind is  made  clear  by  what  he  writes  in  the  last  chapter  of  UPMP:  “The  fact  that
meanings  accrue  to  sounds  during  and  because  of  social  interaction  and  social
interception gives the hypothesis that language as a socio-cultural medium is the source
of the existence of meaning and of understanding-intelligibility factual standing” (318).
And  then  he  concludes:  “The  fact  that  definition  of  language  as  “expression  or
communication of thought” sets forth a secondary and derived function of language and
not itsprimary office supplies indirect confirmation of the view that the social interaction
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of which language is an inherent constituent is the observationally verifiable foundation
of meaning and understanding” (319).
17 The striking similarity between the two texts shows that Dewey never changed his mind
on the dependence of meaning on language, and consequently on the linguistic nature of
the objects that make up our world. At the height of 1942-43, he was still convinced that
meaning originates in and by the use of language, as well as that the proper function of
language is that of “influencing and regulation of behavior of beings who are engaged in
conjoint undertakings of friendly or hostile, cooperative or competitive quality” (319).
One may be perplexed by such a strong continuity of views. Provokingly, one may be even
led to conclude that Dewey did not make any significant progress on that topic in the
twenty  year  period  that  separates  the  publication  of  Experience  and  Nature  from the
composition of  UPMP.  It  is  likely  that  Dewey believed that  the  linguistic  account  of
meaning – drawn largely from Mead – was a completely satisfactory explanation of the
origins of meaning and objectivity, and that therefore nothing remained to him to do but
to accept it and build on it. However, it is difficult not to be dissatisfied with his attitude
towards  these  issues.  The  fact  is that  Dewey’s  linguistic  account  of  meaning  and
objectivity risks to relapse into myth if the relation between experience and language –
between the larger world of which we have experience and the utterances that we make –
is left undetermined.
18 An  example  may  help  to  elucidate  this  point.  Dewey  was  deeply  impressed  by
Malinowski’s description of the linguistic confusions caused by the ambiguity of context.
It is not enough to tap the table and ask “What is this?” to get the desired answer because
different respondents may interpret “this” as referring to very different things: the table,
the shape of the table, its material, the act of tapping, and so on. Words, Dewey says,
“mean what they mean in connection with conjoint activities that effect a common, or
mutually participated in, consequence” (LW 12: 59). As should be clear from what has
been  said  above,  these  activities  are  what  Dewey  usually  calls  “experience”.
Consequently, the very possibility of linguistic agreement relies on the existence of a
context, a situation, an experience, which provides the semantic coordinates necessary to
establish the reference of the word to its object. What is worth noting is that the context,
the situation, the experience, must be loaded with meanings since, according to Dewey,
meaning  cannot  be  ground  on  something  different  from  itself.5 In  the  language  of
Dewey’s  Logic,  symbol  and meaning cannot  be  boiled  down to  sign and signification
(LW12:  58-60).  Now,  being  loaded  with  meanings,  the  background  experience  is  of
linguistic nature. Dewey seems to acknowledge this fact when he writes: “Chair, spade, or
house are meanings as well as physical things. And this statement means more than that
the words have meaning. It signifies that the things called by these names have meanings
and that if we eliminate or exclude the meanings, the things in question are no longer
spades, chairs or houses” (294).
19 The problem with that position is that, having started with the assumption that language
is the only source of meanings, we are led to conclude that – at least in a certain sense –
everything is language. But by blurring the distinction between language and the larger
context in which only the use of language is possible we do not enhance the explanatory
power of the theory, but rather we dramatically affect its validity. This is the difficulty
which we have hinted at above; a difficulty that, to my knowledge, Dewey never explicitly
discusses in his texts. Nonetheless, one particularly promising approach seems to emerge
from  the  tenth  chapter  of  UPMP,  in  which  a  certain  number  of  insights  originally
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formulated in Experience and Nature are developed. In the remaining part of the article I
will try to provide a consistent picture of that rather sketchy outline of explanation.
20 It is evident that the key to the solution to this difficulty is a correct interpretation of the
sense in which one is entitled to say that “at least in a certain sense everything is language”.
To recapitulate: Dewey maintains that our world is a world of qualities that are organized
and structured in objects only because these qualities are perceived as potentialities of
action. But the biological “potentialities” that make the experience of meaningful objects
possible are habits of behavior. Dewey is clear on this point: “As objects of perception
they not only are not isolated qualities but they are not sets or arrangements of qualities
of the organs immediately engaged save as these organs are what they are in virtue of
modifications undergone in previous interactions of use and enjoyment: that is, they are
what they are by virtue of attitudes, tendencies, and dispositions that are acquired and
now habitual” (239). And then he adds: “The qualities of a spade as perceived and named 
are the consequences that would result if it were used (or will result when it is used) –
they are anticipations of what is future at the limited and limiting date of perception”
(239, italics added).
21 This passage has already been quoted above, but it is worth quoting it again because of
the importance of the equivalence introduced by Dewey between perception (perceived)
and  language  (named).  The  function  of  language  is  to  give  a  name  to  the  possible
consequences  of  an  action,  thus  enabling  the  agent  to  abstract  from  the  particular
conditions in which the object is experienced. In the light of this consideration, Dewey’s
argument can be reconstructed as follows: there is a strong functional continuity between
experience and language, context and linguistic utterances, since both are meaningful
transactions  with  the  environment  –  stated  differently,  both  are  ways  of  making
experience  of  meanings.  Every  acquisition  of  concepts  presupposes  and  entails  the
acquisition of a new set of words that modify our vocabulary. Words are ways in which a
cooperative  action  is  brought  about  and  a  community is  established  (320).  Through
linguistic utterances the agent selects a part of the general situation in which he and the
other organisms live as particularly remarkable with respect to a specific purpose, and in
doing so he constitutes an object that different agents can share in a common experience.
22 It follows from what has been said that in the passages mentioned above Dewey reads the
conceptual  couple  actuality/potentiality  in  the  light  of  the  psychological  distinction
between focus and background. Accordingly, the notion of potentiality plays a twofold
role in Dewey’s account of meaning. On the one hand, the qualities of organic action are
structured  in  different  objects  because  the  habits  acquired  in  previous  linguistic 
transactions  with  the  environment  bring  to  light  their  semantic  potentialities.  The
constancy of our habits supplies the basis of the meaningfulness of our world. On the
other hand, when these qualities are explicitly named they are further objectified, and a
common world is created out of an undetermined horizon of possibilities. By uttering a
word  or  a  sentence,  the  potentiality  of  a  very  limited  section  of  the  situation is
emphasized, and the attention of the participants is called to the possible course of action
that the utterer wants to carry out or oppose. So, con- versely, there are two different
ways  in  which  potentiality  can  be  realized  and  turned  into  actuality.  The  first  one
consists of the actualization of the potentialities of nature. Experi- ence is the name that
Dewey uses for this first-level actualization. Indeed, it is a central as- pect of Dewey’s
naturalism that the (linguistic) constitution of meanings should not be con- ceived as a
subjective act of will,  but as the realization of forces already at work in nature.  The
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second-level actualization is performed when the utterance of a word or sentence se-
lects an object – that is, of a group of qualities viewed in terms of their potentialities – out
of a background which provides the general context in the light of which only that actual-
ization is possible.
23 There seems to be something paradoxical in the conclusion that the modern conception
of  object  and  objectivity  developed  by  Dewey  is  ultimately  grounded  on  the  old
conceptual couple potentiality/actuality. It is contradictory, one may argue, to criticize
modern philosophy for not having been able to get rid of pre-modern categories, and, at
the very same time, to reintroduce notions that have been fatally undermined by the
scientific  revolution.  But  it  is  not  the old notion of  potentiality  that  Dewey aims to
reinstate.  Rather,  it  is  a  semantic  version  of  the  relation  between  potentiality  and
actuality that Dewey tries to formulate. To say that the relation between potentiality and
actuality is of semantic nature means that it is not biologically determined, even though
it is biologically-grounded. There are many different possible ways of actualizing a set of
natural  potentialities;  in  different  contexts  of  action  different  potentialities  of  the
situation stand out as relevant, and ask for actualization. The act of constitution of an
object is an act performed by an organism that, to be effective, has to be respectful of the
“objective” potentialities of the situation. The conceptual couple potentiality/actuality
acquires  therefore  a  completely  new  significance  in  the  framework  of  Dewey’s
philosophy:  it  is  the  single  theoretical  hypothesis  that  justifies  the  adoption  of  an
experimental  method of  inquiry,  and paves the way for a naturalistic  explanation of
certain extremely complex organisms’ capabilities to enter into meaningful transactions
with their environment. Far from being a relapse into unmodernity, it is the way in which
it becomes possible for philosophy to get rid of a limited and unsatisfactory conception of
object and objectivity which is rooted in the dogmatic and pre-modern separation of soul
and  body,  and  whose  influence  has  hindered  the  development  of  an  experimental
approach to the comprehension of the world that supports or frustrates our activities.
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NOTES
1. The theoretical advantage of Dewey's naturalistic way to idealism can be easily appreciated if
attention  is  focused  on  the  distinction  between  actions  and  acts:  the  latter  are  mechanical
responses  to  stimuli  while  the  former  are  bits  of  behavior  characterized  by  the  unity  of  a
purpose. Now, the difference existing between an act and an action is all the difference that is
relevant – at least from a pragmatist perspective – between reality and unreality. Reflex acts do
not possess meaning – or, better said, are not instantiations of meaning – since there is no unity
of action and consequences that can be discovered in them: in all these cases, indeed, stimuli are
not interpreted in the light of possible responses which they can bring about. There is a causal
rather than a rational relation between them. This very same point can be expressed in many
other ways: it can be said for instance that reflex arcs are not meaningful because nobody pays
attention to them in normal – that is, no pathological – transactions with the environment; or it
can be said that acts as simple as the blinking of an eye or the jerking of a knee are not part of
our experience because it is impossible to transform them into a sign of something other. What is
common in all these remarks is the insight that reflex acts cannot be said to be real because they
have no semantic value: they do not tell us anything relevant about our world.
2. This is not how Dewey employs the notion of logic in this and other texts, but there is a sense
in which it is possible to say that that use of logic grasps an important insight that undergirds,
Dewey's thought, that is to say, the idea that the goal of every act of reflection – whose structure
is clarified by a logic of inquiry as that espoused by Dewey in his logical texts – is that of revising
old  habits,  thus  creating  a  more  intelligent  and  “self-conscious”  pattern  of  activity.  The
definition of philosophy as a “generalized theory of criticism” makes sense only in this context
(LW1: 9; see also UPMP: 315-6).
3. “[T]he words 'experience,’  'situation,’  etc.,  are  used to  remind the thinker of  the need of
reversion to precisely something which never can be one of the terms of his reflection but which
nevertheless  furnishes the existential  meaning and status of  them all”  (MW 10:  324).  For an
analysis  of  the  extremely  controversial  relationship  between  Dewey  and  Scudder  Klyce,  see
(Rockfeller 1991).
4. From what has been said one may be led to conclude that experience – that is, totality of the
physiological activities taking place in the organism – has nothing to do with the constitution of
meaning since meanings are particular, well-determined habits of behavior. Now, an objection
along  these  lines  is  unwarranted  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  presupposes  the  possibility  of
distinguishing in a systematic way the part from the whole, while it is this very difference that is
criticized  by  Dewey  with  the  emphasis  on  the  primacy  of  activity.  Secondly,  it  relies  on  a
profound misunderstanding of the nature of meaning. Indeed, it  is important to remind that
according to Dewey – and this is  undoubtedly one of  his  permanent Hegelian deposits  – the
universality of a general rule turns out into abstractness – which means uselessness in Dewey's
practice-centered thought – if it cannot be realized in and by the particular qualities on which it
accrues. A meaning is real only when it is an object of which we make exper ience in a particular
situation. Even concepts – which are by definition hypothesis – acquire semantic validity only
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when they show their effectiveness in reconstructing a problematic situation. It is for this reason
that  Dewey  puts  so  much  emphasis  on  the  notion  of  quality  and  qualitative  thought:  the
universality  of  meaning  finds  both  its  realization  and  its  origin  in  the  singularity  of  the
encompassing situation.
5. It is not possible to deal with this problem in detail here, but it has to be remarked that one of
the  greatest  difficulties  of  Dewey's  linguistic  theory  of  meaning  is  precisely  that  of
understanding why he rejects so fully the very possibility of there being a meaning outside and
independently from language. The point is that, according to his views, meaning is a relation
between antecedents and consequences.  Now, a relation of this  kind can be established (and
preserved)  on  a  purely  biological  level  by  the  capacity  of  retention  of  body  (habit).  Dewey
correctly argues that thanks to language we objectify a feeling, thus turning it into the quality of
an object. But he does not explain why the process of objectification cannot be performed by
purely biological habits. Dewey only indicates the difference between animal needs, impulses,
and appetites, on the one hand, and the ways in which human beings articulate these organic
manifestations,  on the other.  In an unpublished manuscript  that  Phillip  Deen has been kind
enough to show me, Dewey writes: “The transformation of hunger, of the methods of satisfying it
and the qualities of enjoyment that attend the latter are a case in point. The physical gnawing of
extreme hunger may become a highly emotionalized apprehension for the fate of loved ones or
of  one’s  community;  the  method of  satisfying  it  may consist  of  highly  indirect  processes  of
agriculture, transportation and trading—together with all the emotional values associated with
fire and the hearth; the final enjoyment may take the form of formalized banquets as well as the
simpler joys of the family board, etc..” But nobody can be interested in denying this fact. The
point is rather that of clarifying how that transformation is possible. This amounts to ask: Why is
Dewey led to conclude that animals do not experience meanings? Is this conclusion consistent
with his radical naturalism? As should be clear, what is at stake here is the very possibility of a
non-reductive naturalism.
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